Abstract: This Article examines the constitutional concerns raised by, and compares the costs and
INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dissolved "a history-making injunction" that governed the treatment of "sexually violent predators" who had been civilly committed at Washington's Special Commitment Center ("SCC" ).t The injunction was the product of litigation brought by SCC residents who, more than seventeen years earlier, had alleged that the conditions of their confinement violated their civil rights. 2 families to participate in treatment, (4) construct a separate treatmentoriented facility, (5) eliminate routine strip searches of SCC residents, (6) eliminate the monitoring of residents' telephone calls and remove its prohibition on outgoing calls, (7) develop improved meal and activity schedules, (8) improve the treatment environment, (9) implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans, (10) implement an oversight program consisting of an internal review process and an external body, and (11) make a constitutionally adequate program a reality. 29 After noting the SCC's "history of noncompliance with the Turay Injunction," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later affirmed Judge Dwyer's order, holding that the district court correctly found that the SCC was providing residents with constitutionally inadequate treatments°T he SCC, however, continued to provide constitutionally inadequate treatment to residents even after the Ninth. Circuit's decision.si hi November 1999, following another evidentiary hearing, Judge Dwyer held the SCC in contempt for failing to take reasonable steps to comply with the Turay Injunction and his NoVember 1998 order." Over the next several years, the SCC still failed to comply with the district court's orders, and, as a result, contempt sanctions accumulated."
After Judge Dwyer's death in 2000, the case was reassigned to Judge Barbara Rothstein and then-Judge Robert Lasnik. 34 In June 2004, Judge Lasnik dissolved many elements of the Turay Injunction and purged Judge Dwyer's 1999 contempt order. 35 Nonetheless, Judge Lasnik still found that the SCC had failed to satisfy the constitutional re--quirements regarding "the development and funding of an off-island LRA," or. "Less Restrictive Alternative" placement to facilitate residents' [Vol. 49:1383 return to the community upon successful treatment.36 Judge Lasnik further held that dissolution of the injunction would be conditioned on a lack of significant "backsliding" by the SCC in meeting the Turay Injunction's original requirements." The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed Judge Lasnik's order. 38 After the case was reassigned to Judge Ricardo Martinez,39 the SCC moved to dissolve the Turay Injunction's remaining provisions. 40 In response, residents submitted extensive evidence demonstrating that the SCC had engaged in the "backsliding" specifically prohibited by Judge Lasnik's order.'" This evidence included (1) reports issued by the Inspection of Care Committee ("IOC committee" or "IOCC"), a group comprised of independent experts appointed by the SCC, which found that the facility's treatment program was inadequate, (2) a declaration from an IOCC expert confirming that the SCC's treatment program did not meet constitutional requirements, (3) several affidavits from residents documenting SCC violations, and (4) a recommendation by Dr. Janice Marques, the former special master, that the Turay injunction be main ta ined. 42 Despite the evidence presented, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing, 43 and on March 23, 2007, the court dissolved the Turay Injunction entirely, abruptly terminating nearly two decades of judicial oversight, despite the SCC's niinimal progress in complying with the terms of the court's injunction." The district court specifically found that the "plaintiffs have demonstrated that some backsliding has occurred with respect to the treatment program at issue in this case."43 Moreover, it observed that "[t] his case has been troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be no right answer, and no good fix for the situation these plaintiffs face at the SCC."46 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the residents' objections by summarily stating, without explanation, that the SCC's backsliding did not "rise to the level of a Constitutional violation."47 The court explained that it dissolved the Turay Injunction because, although the resident's disputed that the SCC had implemented an effective LRA protocol, there was "no dispute" that the SCC had constructed an off-island LRA.48
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CIVIL COMMITMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of civil commitment in three cases: Allen v. Illinois, Kansas v. Hendricks, and Seling v. Young." In those cases, the Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from imposing "punishment" under the guise of civil remedies." As a result, in order for civil commitment schemes to pass constitutional muster, states must provide treatment when individuals are treatable, 51 but the Court has not detailed what treatment, exactly, the Constitution requires.52 Instead, the Court has focused on the criteria used to determine when an individual will be subject to civil commitment." As a result, although it is clear that treatment is an essential element of the due process requirement, the exact parameters of such treatment remain unclear."
A. Allen v. Illinois: Determining Whether a Civil Commitment Program Imposes Punishment
One of the first instances in which the Court evaluated a statutory scheme authorizing civil commitment for sexually violent predators was 46 Id. at *5. 47 Id. at *3-4. 48 Id. at *2-3, 4'5. 42 Id in Allen v. Illinois. 55 In Allen, the Court held that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act was not a "criminal" statute and that individuals in proceedings under the Act could therefore not invoke the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. 58 In determining whether the statute was "criminal" in nature, the Court assessed whether the statute was punitive in either purpose or effect.57
In making this determination, the Court found it significant that the Act required the State to provide "care and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] ... in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care" and that "[i]f the patient is found to be no longer dangerous, the court shall order that he be discharged."58 The Court, however, did not confine its investigation strictly to the statutory text.59 The Court also examined the effect of the statute and decided that the record did not demonstrate that individuals had been "confined under conditions incompatible with the State's asserted interest in treatment."60 The Court, however, was not presented with an opportunity to articulate what constituted sufficient treatment to support a determination that the statute was non-punitive and therefore "civil," as the record contained "little or nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric center."61 Accordingly, in the absence of contrary evidence, the Court could not "say that the conditions of [the] petitioner's confinement themselves amount to 'punishment' and thus render criminal' the proceedings which led to confinement." 62 The dissent agreed that treatment was a critical factor in assessing whether a statute was punitive and therefore "criminal."63 It noted that " [t] In other words, the label applied to a statute by the legislature is not dispositive. 6 Rather, both the majority and dissent agreed that courts must undertake an inquiry into the actual effect of the statute, including whether the stated goal of "treatment" is manifested in practice. 67 Id. As the dissent explained:
With respect to a conventional criminal statute, if a State declared that its goal was "treatment" and "rehabilitation," it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment would still apply. The sexually-dangerous-person proceeding similarly may not escape a characterization as "criminal" simply because a goal is 'treatment." If this were not the case, moreover, nothing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of "dangerous person" statutes to shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven violations of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and "criminal propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply inapplicable.
Id.
established procedures for the civil commitment of indivichials who had a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that caused them to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence." The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act by ruling that it violated due process. 72 In particular, the court held that the Act was defective because it did not require a finding of "mental illness" before an individual was subject to commitment, but only required that the individual suffer from a "mental abnormality." The court further held the program violated due process because the state was not providing constitutionally adequate treatment. 74 A divided U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's decision and held that the Act was constitutional. 75 In the majority opinion, Justice Thomas observed that "[a]lthough freedom from physical restraint 'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,' [the] liberty interest is not absolute"6 and thus, "an individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context."'" Accordingly, the government had the authority in "narrow circumstances" to detain individuals who were unable to control their behavior and consequently posed a danger to public health and safety. 78 The Court also observed that it had "consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confine- (1998) 71 KAN. STAT. ANN. § § 59-29a0) to -29a22 (1994). The Act defined a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." Id. § 59-29a02(13 In particular, the Court made clear that although "[a] finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment," it had "sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.'" 8° The Court also rejected the distinction drawn by the Kansas Supreme Court between "mental illness" and a "mental abnormality,"81 and found that the Kansas statute survived constitutional scrutiny because it limited civil confinement to individuals who "suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." 82 Likewise, the Court found that the Act, as a whole, was not "punitive" in nature." The majority asserted that "none of the parties argue that people institutionalized under the Kansas general civil commitment statute are subject to punitive conditions. "84 Nonetheless, the Court went on to discuss the general parameters for ascertaining when a civil commitment statute imposes "punishment" that conflicts with the due process requirement. 85 The Court noted that 'the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.'"86 The Court added, "The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded." 87 Although the Court acknowledged that Kansas's civil commitment statute might lead to prolonged confinement because the commitment's purpose was "to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others," it was not imposing punishment. 88 79 While we have upheld state civil commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to treat, we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others. A State could hardly be seen as furthering a "punitive" purpose by inmluntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease. Similarly, it would be of little value to require treatment as a precondition for civil confinement of the dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment existed. note the unique and challenging circumstances presented by diagnosed pedophiles. 192 He observed that, as a practical matter, the Kansas statute may result in an individual's lifelong confinement, given that current medical knowledge regarding pedophilia is limited and providing sufficient treatment for pedophiles that would ensure "no serious danger will come from release of the detainee" is inherently difficult. 163 Justice Kennedy did not find this outcome troubling as long as the purpose of commitment was not "simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side," given that "incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil systems of confinement." 1" Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy recognized that the implementation of the Kansas statute might become unquired confinement to "conform to constitutional requirements for care and treatment."
See id. 96 See id. at 368 n.4 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317). 97 See id. at 367-68. 98 Id. 99 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-68. The Court suggested that evidence not in the record would have demonstrated that the State was providing adequate treatment. See id. at 368 n.4. Specifically, the Court noted that, in a hearing regarding the plaintiff's motion for state habeas corpus relief, the trial court had concluded that adequate treatment was being provided. See id. at 368 n.5. The dissent, however, noted that reliance on such extra-record materials would be inappropriate and maintained that, in any event, the majority's conclusion was not warranted. See id. at 391-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting). constitutional if "civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified." 105 The dissent in Hendricks also failed to specifically describe the elements of an adequate treatment program.'" Although the dissent agreed that the plaintiffs commitment was appropriate because he was "mentally ill" and "dangerous," 107 the dissent found that the plaintiff was not receiving constitutionally adequate treatment.'" The dissent disputed the notion that the case involved an "untreatable" detainee.'" The record, it noted, demonstrated that "pedophilia is an 'abnormality' or 'illness' that can be treated." 11° The dissent, however, argued that the record supported the Kansas Supreme Court's finding that "as of the time of [plaintiffs] commitment, the State had not funded treatment, it had not entered into treatment contracts, and it had little, if any, qualified treatment staff," which resulted in the plaintiff "receiving 'essentially no treatment. , "iii Moreover, the dissent suggested that the lack of treatment was consistent with the intent of Kansas legislators when they enacted the statute-to warehouse, rather than treat, potentially dangerous sexual predators.'" Because the dissent believed that the record was devoid of any evidence of treatment, however, it also did not have occasion to discuss adequate treatment procedures. 113 Indeed, the only specific requirement mentioned by the dissent was the statute's failure to provide for the possibility of using less restrictive alternatives to confinement, such as post-release supervision or halfway houses, which were required by similar laws in other states.'" m5 See id. at 373. 106 See id. at 373-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107
id. at 375-77. 08 See id. at 394. 1 " See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In See id. at 378; see also Berliner, supra note 70, at 1209-10 (discussing the range of expert opinions regarding the question of whether recidivism among child molesters and rapists can be reduced through treatment").
In See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that the Kansas statute violated the Due Process Clause because when a State decides offenders can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive. , Finally, in Seling u Young, the Supreme Court resolved an "as applied" challenge to the State of Washington's Community Protection Act, which authorizes the civil commitment of "sexually violent predators." 115 The plaintiff argued that, although the Washington Supreme Court had held that the statute was civil in nature and thus did not violate due process, the statute, as it was applied in his particular case, was punitive and therefore "criminal" in nature.n 6 In particular, the plaintiff maintained that the conditions at Washington's Special Commitment Center were incompatible with the statute's treatment purpose. 117 The Ninth Circuit held that under Hendricks, the plaintiff could bring an "as applied" challenge even if the statute was facially valid. 118
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.'" At the outset, the majority concurred with the Washington Supreme Court that the statute was facially valid."'" Indeed, the Court noted that it was "strikingly similar" to the statute at issue in Hendricks, which also "provided treatment for sexually violent predators: 121 The Court reiterated that, although "not all mental conditions [are] treatable," where conditions are treatable, constitutionally adequate treatment is required. 122 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that plaintiffs "as applied" challenge was "unworkable," because it "would invite an end run around the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the Act is civil in circumstances where a direct attack on that decision is not before this Court." 123
The Court underscored that its decision did "not mean that respondent and others committed as sexually violent predators have no remedy for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at the Ceti- ' See id. at 260-61 ("In fact, Kansas patterned its Act after Washington's."). 122 Id. at 262-63. 122 Id. at 263-64. The Court added that an "as-applied" challenge would, in effect, preclude a final determination concerning whether a statute was "punitive." See id. at 263. ter."124 The Court further noted that the statute conferred an express right to treatment, and there was ongoing litigation regarding the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement at the facility. 126 The Court also observed that the procedural posture of the case gave it "no occasion to consider how the civil nature of a confinement scheme relates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process," 126 or to "consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature." 127
Justice Scalia filed a separate concurrence specifically disputing that this was an "open question."128 Justice Scalia maintained that "any consideration of subsequent implementation in the course of making a 'first instance' determination cannot extend to all subsequent implementation, but must be limited to implementation of confinement, and of other impositions that are 'not a fixed event." 126
In his separate concurrence, Justice Thomas went even further, maintaining that "a statute which is civil on its face cannot be divested of its civil nature simply because of the manner in which it is implemented."'" He wrote that lain implementation-based challenge to a facially civil statute would be as inappropriate in reviewing the statute in the 'first instance."'lsl
In contrast, Justice Stevens maintained in his dissent that the conditions of confinement could be considered at any time in order to 124 Seling, 531 U.S. at 265.
I" See id. at 265-66. As the Court observed, the Special Commitment Center was operat [ing] under an injunction that require [d] it to adopt and implement a plan for training and hiring competent sex offender therapists; to improve relations between residents and treatment providers; to implement a treatment program for residents containing elements required by prevailing professional standards; to develop individual treatment programs; and to provide a psychologist or psychiatrist expert in the diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders to supervise the staff.
Id. at 266.
' 26 Id. at 266, 127 Id. at 266-67 ("We have not squarely addressed the relevance of conditions of confinement to a first instance determination, and that question need not be resolved here."). 128 See id. at 267-70 (Scalia, J., concurring). 129 Seling, 531 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93 (1997)).
1 " See id. at 270 (Thomas, J., concurring). " I Id. at 274 ("The Washington Act does not provide on its face for punitive conditions of confinement, and the actual conditions under which the Act is implemented are of no concern to our inquiry.").
gain "full knowledge of the effects of the statute." 132 Justice Stevens contended that the Court had "consistently looked to the conditions of confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual effect."133 Moreover, he contended that this issue was properly before the Court even though the Washington Supreme Court had previously decided that the statute was in fact "civil." 154 Thus, despite the concurrences maintaining that the actual conditions of confinement could play only a limited role or no role at all in assessing the constitutionality of a civil commitment statute,'" a strong majority of the Court again reaffirmed that, although the plaintiff's "as applied" challenge failed, the conditions of confinement were properly considered in assessing the constitutionality of the statute "in the first instance."136 The Court again affirmed that treatment was a necessary element to support the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes. And, again, because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court did not have the opportunity to fully articulate the elements of a constitutionally adequate treatment program.'"
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING WHETHER TREATMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE
Because the Supreme Court has failed to articulate the specific elements of a constitutionally adequate treatment program, the lower federal courts have been left to fill the gap.'" In particular, the seventeen-year litigation over Washington's civil commitment program has helped establish a framework for assessing the constitutionality of such programs. 1" That framework includes basic requirements such as: (1) the right to individualized treatment that provides an avenue to eventual release upon successful treatment, (2) nisms, and (3) the principles governing judicial oversight. 14° These basic principles shape the contours of the states' obligations in administering treatment programs that balance committed individuals' constitutional rights with protecting the general public."' Washington's civil commitment statute, like others around the coun try, 142 allows the state to indefinitely commit individuals classified as "sexually violent predators" after they have served or are about to complete their prison sentences. 143 The statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as an individual who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility."'" The state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is a "sexually violent predator." 145 The statute specifically recognizes that committed individuals have a right to "adequate care and individualized treatment:146
Under the statute,'a committed person is entitled to an annual examination of the individual's mental condition. 147 If the examination indicates that the individual's condition is so changed that he is not likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, state officials must authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release and discharge. 148 In addition, the detainee may independently petition for discharge from confinement. will be granted, the central question is whether the individual's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he is no longer likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.'" Accordingly, the statute specifically recognizes that committed individuals have a right to "adequate care and individualized treatment." 151 Courts presiding over Washington's SCC litigation have recognized that, under well-settled Supreme Court precedent, the Due Process Clause similarly requires that states provide civilly-committed individuals access to treatment that "gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released." 152 This involves examining whether treatment decisions meet "professionally accepted minimum standards."'" The courts have noted that "[b] ecause the purpose of confinement is not punitive, the state must also provide the civilly-committed [individuals] with 'more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.'" 154 Lower courts, however, have been left to identify what conditions are sufficiently nonpunitive and also afford residents a "realistic opportunity" to be successfully treated and released.' 55
A. The Elements of Washington's Individualized Treatment Program
The SCC litigation has done much to flesh out the constitutional requirements for civil commitment treatment programs. 156 Over the litigation's seventeen-year history, the courts received input from experts who provided direction regarding minimally acceptable standards governing such programs. 157 In the process, the courts articulated a variety of guidelines, implemented in the Turay Injunction, requiring the SCC to implement certain treatment procedures in order to provide residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. 158 150 A cornerstone of a constitutionally adequate civil commitment treatment program is individualized treatment) 59 In the SCC litigation, the district court repeatedly underscored the necessity of an individualized approach to treatment. 36° As the court observed, "[Ondividualized treatment plans are critical and should provide for systematic measurements of the individual's progress." 16I The court added that a successful treatment program should demonstrate "the way to improvement and release" and contain "the components recognized as necessary for maximum treatment potential. "162
Quality interaction between residents and staff is also important in constructing a constitutionally adequate treatment program. 163 In the SCC litigation, the courts addressed a range of allegations regarding staff abuse of residents, as well as the generally poor interaction between staff and residents, which undermined successful treatment)" Accordingly, the Turay Injunction required the SCC to not only prevent staff abuse, but also "required [the] SCC to take steps to rectify the lack of trust between the residents and staff." 165 The Ninth Circuit held that such a requirement is necessary to avoid "severely hampering effective treatmen t. "166
The court also found that the SCC lacked "adequate grievance procedures and behavior management plans," which constitute another "generally accepted component of effective treatment programs."167 The district court in the SCC litigation found that "[a]ll parties recognize that the prompt and fair handling of grievances is an 159 essential part of the treatment environment."168 Historically, however, the grievance system at the SCC had been "ineffective and failed to result in individualized responses." 169 These deficiencies led to "a general mistrust of the grievance system among residents."'" Next, the district court found that the involvement of residents' family members is an essential element of a constitutionally adequate treatment program."' When it was created, the SCC program imposed significant barriers to the participation of family members in treatment. 172 The district court directed the SCC to remove those barriers, finding that family participation was another important aspect of successful treatment.'" Finally, an essential element of the Turay Injunction required the SCC to establish a less restrictive alternative ("LRA") program that placed residents on a path toward eventual release. 174 Indeed, the district court observed:
[T]his phase [of the treatment program] is required by statute, and confirmed by all experts on both sides as a vital part of the professional minimum standards. Without LRAs, the constitutional requirement of treatment leading, if successful, to cure and release, cannot fully be met. This area is described by the special master as "the most important piece of unfinished business in the SCC program."'" Accordingly, the district court emphasized the need for development of constitutionally and statutorily required LRAs, 176 and, as in other areas of injunction compliance, emphasized that it must monitor the SCC's progress to ensure program changes were effectively implemented.'"
B. Constitutionally Adequate Oversight
The district court found that adequate oversight mechanisms were critical to ensuring the provision of constitutionally adequate treatment to SCC residents. 178 Indeed, a key finding supporting the Turay Injunction was that "the SCC program lacked sufficient oversight," During the course of the proceedings, the court developed several potential oversight inechanisms. 18° First, the Inspection of Care Committee (the "IOCC"), a panel of independent experts familiar with the treatment of sexually violent predators, conducted annual inspections and issued reports regarding the SCC's treatment program. 181 Second, the court appointed an ombudsman to observe staff-resident relations at the SCC, respond to complaints, and assist in the resolution of complaints because "residents' complaints of mistreatment by staff have proliferated to a point that jeopardizes the defendants' ability to provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment as required by the injunction."182 Finally, a resident advisory council was appointed and tasked with being "fully informed and consulted about important projects."m 176 See Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 177 See, e.g., Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 20. The court added, "Court oversight continues to be essential to ensure the defendants ... correct the ongoing deficiencies in the treatment program so as to provide SCC residents with a discernable path toward release."
Id. These additional oversight mechanisms supplemented the oversight provided by the district court and the court-appointed special master. 184
C. Principles Governing Judicial Oversight
The courts have also formulated guidelines for judicial oversight of treatment programs. 189 For example, the Ninth Circuit made clear that, in evaluating the constitutionality of civil commitment treatment programs, the courts may not simply "defer to the professional judgment of the ... superintendent and clinical director." 188 Rather, they must "look[] beyond the ... administrators' assertions of compliance" in order to determine whether the state has "fulfilled the requirements" under the Constitution and the court's injunction.' 87 Indeed, in affirming the Turay Injunction, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly rejected the SCC's "principal contention" that courts must "defer to the professional judgment of the SCC superintendent and clinical director. The district court also emphasized that it would continue to review the SCC's compliance with the terms of the Turay Injunction in order to ensure that there was no "backsliding. When the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SCC's request to dissolve the Turay Injunction, the court observed, "A history of noncompliance with prior orders can justify greater court involvement than is ordinarily permitted." 194 In order to demonstrate that an injunction should be dissolved, defendants must demonstrate that constitutional requirements are being met and that defendants are unlikely to "return to [their] former ways:195 These concerns applied in the SCC litigation, where the district court concluded that residents had a "valid concern that without judicial oversight, the SCC and its treatment program will eventually revert back to the very structure that gave rise to this lawsuit in the first place." 196 As the district court observed, the issues in the case were "serious" and the appropriate solutions "appeared difficult at best."'" Accordingly, judicial supervision was "essential" given the SCC's recalcitrance and repeated failure to comply with its constitutional obligations.'" slip op. at 13. The court also noted it would oversee the SCC regarding elements of the Turay Injunction that had been dissolved. See The Court acknowledges plaintiffs' valid concern that without judicial oversight, the SCC and its treatment program will eventually revert back to the very structure that gave rise to this lawsuit in the first place, The Court recognizes that, historically, remedial action has not occurred at the SCC until defendants have been faced with an imminent status hearing before this Court. The Court, too, is concerned that without judicial oversight, the efforts made by all parties to date may be undone.
IV. THE SCC's NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL

OBLIGATIONS
Although the courts presiding over the SCC litigation have developed specific and well-defined criteria for assessing whether a civil commitment treatment program meets constitutional requirements, compliance with these requirements has been illusive. 199 Indeed, a string of judicial decisions have documented the SCC's long history of failing to provide constitutionally adequate treatment for residents. 200 The Ninth Circuit has highlighted "the state's repeated and documented failures to rectify the constitutional shortcomings of its civil commitment facilities for sex offenders,"20 and in particular, the SCC's "history of noncompliance with the Turay Injunction."202 Nonetheless, in 2007, the district court granted the SCC's request to dissolve the Turay Injunction, despite the SCC's "backsliding" with respect to its compliance with constitutional requirements.2°3
A. The SCC's Repeated Requests to Dissolve the Turay Injunction Despite Its Noncompliance
From the outset of the litigation in 1994, the SCC failed to comply with the district court's orders to improve its treatment program. 204
Shortly after the district court issued the Turay Injunction, the court held that the SCC had failed to present a sufficient plan for compliance. 2°9 As a result, the court entered a supplemental order that clarified the terms of the injunction and appointed a special master to oversee the SCC's compliance. 2°6
Over a year later, the SCC still had not complied with the terms of the injunction, and residents moved for contempt sanctions and further injunctive relief. 207 Although the district court denied the request for contempt sanctions, it granted an unopposed portion of the motion seeking the appointment of a full-time ombudsman to internally review the SCC's progress. 208 The court added that "the motion raises serious issues" since the SCC "still [has] not complied adequately" with the court's rulings."9
On March 6, 1996, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the residents' renewed request for contempt sanctions as well as the SCC's motion for release from the Turay Injunction. 210 The court denied the SCC's release request, finding that "more remains to be done to achieve full compliance,"211 and that the "[SCC] must work diligently with the Special Master to achieve full compliance with the injunction. "212 ing that "conditions and treatment in the SVP program fell below constitutional standards"); John Q. Feb. 4, 1997) . The court found that "compliance with the injunction is still not complete" because the SCC was not providing residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. Id. at 6. For example, the court noted that the SCC had failed to establish a community transition component, had not adequately integrated family members into the treatment program, and had not provided "a structure for objective, external oversight." Id. at 4-5.
After additional evidentiary hearings, the district court entered another order on October 1, 1997, finding that the "[SCC] [has] not yet achieved full compliance with the injunction" and that "[t]tle central need is to translate into reality a program that exists on paper." 2" The court observed that "[w] hat is required is not just a plan but a reality-the genuine providing of adequate mental health treatment to all SCC residents willing to accept it." 214 The court held that such a fully operational program must include the following components, which were lacking:
[T]hat the staff members understand the treatment model and their roles within it; that the delivery of services be effective and consistent across treatment teams; that residents know what they must do to move toward release and where they are in the treatment process; that there be ongoing monitoring of the treatment process; that measures of progress be correlated to the goals of treatment; that the residents know the program policies; that policy enforcement be consistent; that the residents be treated with respect; and that the program be able to deal with the long-term needs of those not engaged in treatment.215
On March 30, 1998, the court entered an order finding that the SCC had improperly attempted to curtail the court-appointed ombudsman's authority to conduct investigations. 216 The court directed the SCC "to refrain from any further attempts to alter court-ordered requirements without obtaining court approval." 217 After another evidentiary hearing and site visit, on November 25, 1998, the court held that the "defendants have not yet made constitutionally adequate mental health treatment available to the plaintiffs." 218 The court found that "Mile necessity of keeping the injunction in force has been confirmed by every independent expert who testified or whose opinion otherwise appears in the record, including defendants' expert."219 The court cited several deficiencies in the SCC's compliance, including "a need for additional staff training," the lack of a "coherent and individualized treatment plan for each resident," "inadequate provision at SCC for participation by residents' families in their rehabilitation," and the lack of "[flair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans. "220 In affirming Judge Dwyer's November 1998 order, the Ninth Circuit agreed that "the district court correctly concluded that the [SCC] had made decisions about the program that fell well below professional standards for treatment of sexual offenders," and that there were "numerous inadequacies" in the SCC's treatment program. 22 i As the court observed, "At the time of the 1998 hearing (and at a number of hearings in between the 1994 and 1998 orders), the district court found that few, if any, of its initial requirements had been satisfied and that in some instances progress had actually been set back .. "222
B. The SCC's Citation for Contempt of Court
In 1999, the district court held additional hearings and once again found that the SCC "intentionally disregarded the injunction's requirements."223 The court held that the SCC "persistently [has] failed to make constitutionally adequate mental health treatment available to the SCC residents, and [has] departed so substantially from professional minimum standards as to demonstrate that their decisions and practices were not and are not based on their professional judgment."224 Finally, the court found that the State had treated the SCC "as an unwanted stepchild" for whom it "failed to devote the resources necessary to achieve compliance." 225
In its ruling, the court relied upon a report issued by the IOCC.226 The report "made findings of deficiencies similar to those found by the court and the special master" and highlighted "a further serious concern, that of inadequate medical staff and facilities for the 21° SCC residents."227 These failings were so apparent that the SCC "did not contend that injunction compliance has been achieved, and did •not seek dissolution of the injunction." 228 The court added, "Instead, [the SCC] recognized through the testimony of managerial employees, and through counsel, that minimum professional standards for,treating sex offenders are not fully met and that the goal of providing constitutionally adequate mental health treatment is still unattained." 229
The district court also found that the SCC had "fallen into a pattern of first denying that anything is amiss at [the] SCC, then engaging in a flurry of activity to make improvements before the next court hearing, then admitting at the hearing that shortfalls of constitutional magnitude still exist, then returning to denial."2" The court concluded that this "entrenched resistance has impeded prompt and wholehearted compliance with court orders protecting basic liberties." 291 As a result, the court held the SCC in contempt for its willful failure to comply with the court's prior orders, finding that sanctions were "essential" to obtain the SCC's compliance. 232 As a result of the SCC's continued noncompliance, these sanctions remained in place and continued to accrue for several years. 2" In May 2000, Judge Dwyer issued additional findings after conducting another evidentiary hearing.294 Judge Dwyer reiterated that the SCC had "failed to make constitutionally adequate mental health treatment available to the SCC residents, and [had] departed so substantially from professional minimum standards as to demonstrate that their decisions and practices were not and are not based on their professional judgment."2" The court found that "[s]hortfalls continue to exist in every area as the result of earlier failures to take the necessary steps.'"296 Ac- After Judge Dwyer's death, his replacement, Judge Rothstein, also found that the SCC failed to provide constitutionally adequate treatment and that "injunction compliance remains incomplete."244 Like Judge Dwyer, she found that each impending hearing caused "a flurry of activity occurring in the weeks-or days-prior to the hearing" in order to create the appearance of compliance, but each time, the SCC failed to comply with the district court's orders. 
The District Court's Order Purging the Accrued Contempt Sanctions
Judge Rothstein became Director of the Federal Judicial Center in 2003, and, as a result, the case was reassigned to Judge Robert Lasnik on an interim basis. 2" Judge Lasnik abruptly purged the contempt finding and dissolved several components of the Turay Injunction 252-components the court had previously found were "essential" in "stimulating [the SCC's] compliance." 253 Nonetheless, recognizing the SCC's history of noncompliance, Judge Lasnik conditioned his dissolution on the requirement that there be "no significant `backsliding.'" 254 Moreover, he refused to dissolve the injunction in its entirety, holding that: clan medical director is needed." 261 Additionally, "a significant number [of residents] complained about not knowing what they had to do to advance in levels and phases" in the treatment program. 262 Finally, the report observed that there were still problems with the SCC's grievance system, noting that "not all residents are treated uniformly."268 IOCC members further remarked that the SCC had significantly interfered with its oversight of the treatment program. 2M Prior to the IOCC's survey, Dr. Dorcas Dobie, one of the founding members of the IOCC, resigned after she concluded that SCC management was not addressing problems identified by the Conunittee. 266 In her resignation letter, Dr. Dobie cited the SCC's "adversarial" approach that "dispute [s] the validity of [the IOCC's] findings rather than [resolves] the identified problems."266 Similarly, Maureen Saylor, another member of the IOCC, observed that because the "SCC pays for [the] IOCC to do its work," the "SCC tends to want to be in charge of how the survey does its work" and "had shown a definite move to directly control what and how the committee does [its] work." 267 After the resignations, the SCC appointed two members to the IOCC-both former Washington Department of Safety and Health Services ("DSHS") employees-without consulting the two remaining IOCC members. 268 The SCC also announced new "standards" governing the IOCC's work. 269 The IOCC noted that these actions sought to "directly control what and how the committee does it's [sic] work."2" In addition, the IOCC noted problems with the court-appointed ombudsman's ability to engage in oversight and observed that the "ombudsperson identified problems in ob- [Vol. 49:1383 tabling documentation [from the SCC] necessary for her to fulfill her assigned responsibilities. " 271 This was not the first time that the SCC had interfered with oversight mechanisms. 272 The SCC had repeatedly attempted to silence court-appointed ombudsmen who were critical of the treatment conditicins at the SCC. 275 For example, after the SCC unilaterally terminated the court-appointed ombudsman, the district court was forced to issue an order on February 11, 1997, directing that the SCC not take such unilateral action without a court order. 274 In March 1998, after the SCC ordered the ombudsman to cease an investigation of an incident at the SCC, the district court again directed the SCC to refrain from interfering with the ombudsman, holding that the SCC's "attempt to curtail [the ombudsman's] authority ... cannot be allowed to stand." 275 And, in September 1999, the SCC filed a motion to remove the ombudsman, which the court promptly denied. 276
The January 2006 IOCC Report
The IOCC documented further departures from minimally acceptable standards of professional care in its January 2006 submission.277 It reported that Islince 1999 the IOCC has identified a plethora of serious problems at [the] SCC; many of which have existed for some time and continue to exist."278 The report concluded that "there are several areas of concern regarding program functioning," and although "the major areas have been addressed and readdressed, suggestions offered, plans proposed and implemented ....still the problems have persisted."279 As Dr. Robert Briody, a senior member of the IOCC, stated in a declaration submitted to the district court, " [t] sions go to the very heart of providing adequately and constitutionally required care for residents at the SCC."280 Dr. Briody observed that although "SCC management has acknowledged many of the problems identified by the IOCC, ... no real change has occurred."281 Moreover, because these problems were "so persistent," Dr. Briody concluded that "improvement will not occur without external oversight and some form of continued enforcement to require compliance with the oversight body."282 Indeed, the IOCC report documented numerous deficiencies in the SCC's treatment program. 288 First, the IOCC found that ineffective management and supervision hampered the SCC's treatment program and its ability to respond to the problems previously identified by the district court and the IOCC. 284 Moreover, the report concluded that there were "pervasive problems in management at the SCC"285 and that "[s]upervisors at the SCC simply don't actively supervise line staff."288 Moreover, "SCC administration does not grasp the extent of its own management problems."287 Second, the IOCC found that the SCC had failed to address obvious deficiencies in its treatment program and noted, "If the IOCC does not call obvious problems to the attention of SCC managers, obvious problems seem to go unnoticed or are simply ignored." 288 The report further found that internal review mechanisms at the SCC were "dysfunctional and have consistently failed to identify key areas for required improvement to ensure necessary solutions." 289 These problems included "use of force, safety violations, and allegations of staff abusing residents and medical errors."290 The report concluded that "[slince 280 Declaration of Robert Briody § § 6-7, Turay v. Richards 1999 the IOCC has identified a plethora of serious problems at Ethel SCC," but these problems have gone uncorrected "because the Quality Committee and the leadership staff have been less than effective." 29 i Third, the IOCC found that the SCC consistently failed to adequately integrate medical and psychiatric care into the residents' treatment program.292 The report added that "[c]ollaboration with the treatment team [was] not evident based on [the IOCC's] clinical File review" -an "expected protocol" that "must be initiated." 295 The IOCC found this problem to be especially disconcerting since "all residents have been assigned a DSM III, Axis I and/or II diagnosis and therefore have psychiatric needs."294 Fourth, the IOCC identified significant problems in the provision of health care services.295 Health care services were "disorganized and poorly managed," and there was a lack of professional nursing practice."296 The report found that there was "no system to ensure accurate delivery and tracking of medications" and that "[t] he procedure for ensuring patient medication compliance is not acceptable." 297 Moreover, the IOCC found "poor staffing patterns, failure to identify staff assignments and tasks, poor fiscal management, ineffective communication processes and deteriorating staff morale." 298 Accordingly, the IOCC "continue [d] to stress the significance of the deficiencies cited within nursing services at [the] SCC" and emphasized that it "feels strongly that it is the responsibility of SCC administration to ensure that the residents' physical and mental health needs are addressed in keeping with best professional practice." 299 Fifth, the IOCC identified deficiencies in the SCC's clinical and medical files.") The report found that "[t] he frequency of medication.
29 ' See id. at 33. 292 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(h). The report noted that "Weview of the clinical file and treatment plan revealed that medical personnel rarely participate in the treatment plan development. This particular issue has been noted by the IOCC since 1999." Jan. Id. at 10. The report added, "Since 1999 the SCC administration has provided excuses for the quality problems and documentation deficiencies in the clinical and medical files... , None-the-less, quality of file entries and medical and clinical record keeping continues to be an area of serious and substantial difficulty." Id.
error is unreported and occurs at a much greater frequency than the facility's data would indicate and more often than is acceptable given the number of residents receiving meds."301 In addition, the SCC had ignored "guidelines and resources" that the IOCC recommended the SCC "incorporate [] into the protocols for treatment of SCC patients."'" Sixth, the IOCC found that "repetitive and persistent" personal sanitation and safety concerns were ignored."' The IOCC believed this finding was evidence of a more pervasive problem, noting that qt.] he persistent problems in the areas of room sanitation, obstructions to emergency egress from rooms, clutter, unauthorized food, patient hygiene, shielded light and obstructed visibility are indicative of the direct care and clinical staff not adequately doing their job."304 The IOCC underscored that the monitoring of the aging residents' hygiene and health care needs "is clearly a nursing responsibility and function" that "need[s] to be an integral part of resident care." 305 The IOCC found that the SCC's disregard for these problems "demonstrates a lack of appreciation for professional nursing practice and its contribution to the treatment team."306 Seventh, the IOCC identified a lack of staff professionalism, including poor interaction between residents and SCC staff. 3o7 Additionally, the report observed that direct care staff were "not being fair, firm and consistent (according to policy and procedure) in their treatment and supervision of residents,"3" and that "[c]omplaints of staff abuse" had "increased."309 The IOCC observed that staff behavior "has been an area of concern to both past and present IOC surveyors" and required further review "in upcoming surveys. "MO Eighth, the IOCC found that there were significant shortcomings in external and internal oversight mechanist-m.311 In particular, the IOCC reported that the SCC had shown disregard for the IOCC and its " 1 Id. at 27. 3°2 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(h). 3°3 Id. § 6(i). The report noted there has been "no real improvement" in this area. Id Finally, the IOCC found that because of the deficiencies in the SCC's treatment programs "the number of residents participating in treatment has decreased significantly."316 As a result, the IOCC concluded that the SCC was failing to meet its stated goal of providing residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. 317
The Former Special Master's Submission
The former special master, Dr. Janice Marques, also concluded that continued judicial supervision was warranted. 918 Dr. Marques submitted a declaration urging the court to maintain the Turay Injunction until adequate oversight mechanisms were in place. 5" In particular, Dr. Marques noted the "long-term pattern of non-responsiveness of SCC management to problems that have been identified by the 10C." 32° Dr. Marques declared that the Turay Injunction had been "critical" in compelling the SCC to take any action to improve conditions at the facility.321 Accordingly, because it was "unclear" that oversight mechanisms " 2 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 1 (discussing that, despite the IOCC's past suggestions, the same problems persist). Despite the SCC's continued failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment, in 2007, the district court dissolved the Turay Injunction.323 The court agreed that residents had submitted substantial evidence demonstrating the SCC's "backsliding."324 During the proceedings before the district court, the SCC even conceded that there were problems with the management and supervision of the SCC's treatment program:
The IOCC has identified a need for increased supervision of residential staff. Although this has been a goal of the program for quite some time, reaching the goal has been challenging for the SCC .... With the active growth of the program, particularly since the move to the new facility, there has been the added difficulty of recruiting and hiring mature individuals within the relatively new classes of supervisors and managers. 325
The SCC also admitted that "the integration of medical and clinical treatment has been a challenge for the program, as has managing medical services and staff generally," 326 and it further conceded that the IOCC's "comments [regarding persistent sanitation and safety problems] raise valid concerns. "327 The district court had relied on similar findings in the past in concluding that the SCC was not providing constitutionally adequate treat- ment.328 Indeed, when the IOCC had previously issued similarly critical reports, the SCC had conceded that it failed to meet "minimum professional standards. "329 Nonetheless, the district court dissolved the injunction and denied the residents' request to present additional evidence during an evidentiary hearing. 330 Eight days before the court dissolved the Turay Injunction, the SCC submitted a mandatory status report to the court stating that the reconstituted IOCC had given a preliminary briefing to the SCC and would issue a final report "within the next thirty days." 331 Nonetheless, the district court did not wait for the new IOCC report. 332 Instead, it promptly dissolved the Turay Injunction, stating, "This case has been troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be no right answer, and no good fix for the situation these plaintiffs face at the SCC." 333 Although the court shared the "sense of frustration obviously felt by ... the residents"3" and acknowledged that the issues they raised were "serious," the court still granted the State's motion and dissolved the injunction. 333
The must look "beyond the SCC administrators' assertions of compliance,"337 and could not "defer to the professional judgment of the SCC superintendent and clinical director," the district court based its conclusions on the assertions of SCC staff regarding "ongoing efforts by the SCC program managers to improve the program." 3" The district court did not address any of the specific findings in the IOCC reports documenting "persistent," "pervasive," and "serious," problems in the SCC's treatment program.'" The court also did not mention the former special master's recommendation that court oversight should continue given the long-term pattern of non-responsiveness of SCC management to problems that have been identified by the IOC," and the fact that there had been no "demonstration that external oversight of the program is working as the Court intended." 4° Instead, the district Court relied heavily on the length of time the Turay Injunction had been in place and asserted that "injunctions against the state are not intended to operate in perpetuity. The SCC litigation's seventeen-year history demonstrates the inherent difficulty in enforcing government compliance with the treatment requirement.347 To the extent that enforcing the treatment requirement involves significant costs, civil commitment becomes a less attractive alternative to protect the public from potentially dangerous in d ividuals. ' 48 Moreover, the benefits of treatment are far from clear. 349 Does treatment reduce recidivism? Can it reduce the dangerousness of sexually violent predators such that the risks of releasing them into society are acceptable? There is a strong and ongoing scientific debate regarding these questions, and, as a result, there are significant concerns regarding the potential benefits of civil commitment and treatment programs.") Finally, the recalcitrance of government officials to provide constitutionally adequate treatment suggests that, from the beginning, they did not intend to use civil commitment to rehabilitate offenders. 351 Instead, their actions demonstrate a desire to use civil commitment as a means to warehouse potentially dangerous defendants after their criminal sentences have expired. 352 Thus, although the Supreme Court has upheld civil commitment statutes because they typically mandate treatment and thus do not have a solely punitive purpose, in practice, the promise of treatment has not been fulfillec1. 353 The SCC litigation demonstrates the potential drawbacks of relying primarily on the statutory text and legislative history in determining whether a civil commitment scheme meets constitutional requirements. 354 
B. Potential Alternatives
One potential alternative to civil commitment programs is to increase the penalties for crimes involving sexual violence. 360 Although tougher criminal penalties may create less flexibility in dealing with individual violators, they have the advantage of avoiding the extensive costs associated with civil commitment" 361 Indeed, the SCC litigation suggests that civil commitment programs, in many instances, are simply after-the-fact attempts to impose additional punishment.362 Jurisdictions that impose weak penalties for crimes of sexual violence may seek civil commitment as a backstop to impose additional incarceration and ensure that individuals who are clearly dangerous are not allowed to reenter society.363 . Thus, in a state like Washington, which had historically taken a lax, if not permissive, approach to sexually violent offenses, the statutory scheme has functioned solely to further incapacitate criminal defendants. 364 Moreover, judicial supervision has proven ineffective in addressing these problems. 363 In Washington, after seventeen years of involvement, the courts have abandoned their efforts to enforce compliance in pro-viding constitutionally adequate treatment, at least in part due to the length of the prior judicial supenision. 366 The courts abandoned their supervision despite the fact that "mere passage of time" is an insufficient basis for dissolving an•injunction. 367
More fundamentally, the primary reason the Turay Injunction was in place for seventeen years was the SCC's repeated and undisputed noncompliance with constitutional requirements. 368 Thus, the district court's dissolution of the injunction threatens to reward the SCC for its willful noncompliance. 369 Indeed, prior noncompliance generally warrants continued judicial supervision, not dissolution of a court's injunction.37° Thus, the litigation's final result has, in effect, produced what the Supreme Court has prohibited: the "warehousing" of detainees whose criminal sentences have expired under the guise of civil commitment. 371
Under these circumstances, there exists a powerful argument that the costs of civil commitment outweigh the costs associated with increased criminal penalties for sexually violent crimes. 372 Because the state's motivation appears to be incapacitation and further punishment, simply increasing criminal penalties would be preferable to enacting civil commitment schemes. 373 Civil commitment programs inevitably become the subject of extensive litigation, as states are reluctant to pro- [T] hese plaintiffs, and others involuntarily confined through civil proceedings, cannot simply be warehoused and put out of sight; they must be afforded adequate treatment."). 373 See Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18 (documenting the SCC's repeated failures to comply with court orders to improve the treatment program); Agudo, supra note 360, at 337 (discussing the costs associated with civil laws designed to confine or monitor sexual offenders); Pfaffenroth, supra note 361, at 2257 & n.173, 2262 (discussing the need to consider the extensive costs of civil commitment programs). vide adequate treatment programs that provide a pathway to eventual release. 374
There are costs associated with such an approach that should not be discounted. Increasing criminal penalties across the board may leave prosecutors less discretion to seek just sentences based on the individual facts and circumstances of each case. 375 Moreover, some argue convictions may be more difficult to obtain if there are stringent mandatory minimum sentences. 378 Finally, there are the obvious costs of lengthier confinements.377 Nonetheless, given the problems associated with civil commitment, 378 coupled with the deficiencies in treatment programs, these costs arguably pale in comparison to the costs being incurred under the current civil commitment system. 379
CONCLUSION
The debate over the costs and benefits of civil commitment and its associated constitutional concerns is likely to continue for many years to come. The experience under Washington's civil commitment program, however, raises significant concerns regarding the utility of civil commitment as a means of protecting society from potentially danger- Psvcnot.. 1431 Psvcnot.. , 1439 Psvcnot.. (1978 (concluding that studies showed that an increase in the severity of the prescribed penalty for an offence" led to an adjustment of subjects' conviction criteria such that more proof of guilt was required for conviction" and, as a result, there was "a reduced probability of conviction"), with Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decisionmaking, 7 PsvcnoL. Pug. POLY & L. 622, 671 (2001) (summarizing literature showing that "mandatory sentence length (0-2 years vs. 15 or more years) did not affect verdicts" and that there was only "a negligible difference in conviction rates as a function of sentence severity"). Berliner, supra note 70, at 1215 ('The substantial increased costs associated with incarcerating more (sexually violent] criminals for longer periods of time is a price citizens are willing to pay for immediate community safety."). ous sexual offenders. The litigation-imposes significant costs on both states and the judicial system. Washington, though, has persisted in its refusal to comply with its constitutional obligations to provide adequate treatment. This recalcitrance manifests an intent to incapacitate, if not punish, rather than provide the treatment mandated by the applicable Washington statute and the United States Constitution. In essence, the Washington scheme is serving as a highly inefficient means of imposing additional criminal "punishment."
As such, one must ask whether increasing criminal penalties for sexually violent predators would be preferable to the current .system. Not only are there significant constitutional concerns associated with civil commitment, but there are also extensive economic costs. Abandoning civil commitment in favor of increased criminal penalties-accompanied by constitutional guarantees found in the criminal systemwould arguably mitigate these Costs, and, at the same time, avoid many of the constitutional pitfalls associated with civil commitment.
